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Electrifying Solutions for the Shocking
and Disparate Treatment of Electricity
Within Product Liability Law
I. Introduction
Recently, a Maryland jury awarded a grieving mother $7.5 mil-
lion for the wrongful death of her fifteen-year-old daughter, who had
touched a sagging power line.' Two years before, a court in another
state found an electric company liable when a youth assembled tent
poles together and touched an electric wire hanging in his residential
neighborhood.2 In 1977, a jury awarded a youth a million dollar ver-
dict for the injuries he incurred when he backed into an electric wire
while removing shingles on a roof for his employer.' In these and
other recent cases, courts have found electric companies liable under
theories of negligence, gross negligence, an implied warranty or
strict product liability." Some courts in deciding cases factually simi-
lar to those above, have held that electric utilities cannot, as a mat-
ter of law, be liable for such injuries.3 Other courts have held that
decisions about the negligence of electric utilities6 or the contribu-
tory negligence of an injured youth are proper questions for a jury to
resolve.
7
One reason courts have reached different conclusions when
1. Smith v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., No. 87-8879 (Prince Georges Co., Md. Aug. 18,
1988), afftd, No. 1395 (Md. Ct. of Special Appeals, June 8, 1989).
2. Houston Lighting & Power Co. v. Reynolds, 712 S.W.2d 761 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986),
rev'd, No. 126108 (Tex. Nov. 30, 1988) (WESTLAW. States library, TX file).
3. Kulhanjian v. Detroit Edison Co., 73 Mich. App. 347, 251 N.W.2d 580 (1977).
4. See Id. at 355-56, 251 N.W.2d at 584 (applying theories of gross negligence and
implied warranty); Houston, 712 S.W.2d at 773 (applying strict liability). See also Nelson v.
Commonwealth Edison Co., 124 II. App. 3d 655, 663, 666-68, 465 N.E.2d 513, 519 (1984)
(holding that the utility was not strictly liable for a ten-year-old boy's burns suffered when he
came near uninsulated high voltage power lines while holding a spool of cooper wire).
5. See Sessums v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 652 F.2d 579 (5th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 455 U.S. 948 (1982) (holding that the utility was not strictly liable when a nineteen-
year-old youth touched a power line with a citizen's band antenna); Brigham v. Moon Lake
Elec. Ass'n., 24 Utah 2d 292, 470 P.2d 393 (1970) (holding that a utility was not strictly
liable when a ten-year-old boy came into contact with high voltage line after a utility pole had
fallen); Bosley v. Central Vermont Pub. Serv. Corp., 127 Vt. 581, 255 A.2d 671 (1969) (hold-
ing that the utility is not strictly liable when a nine-year-old boy was injured while playing in a
tree through which a transmission wire passed).
6. See Kemp v. Wisconsin Elec. Power Co., 44 Wis. 2d 571, 172 N.W.2d 161 (1969)
(minor burned when wires attached to his model airplane came into contact with uninsulated
high power lines); Nelson, 124 III. App. 3d at - 465 N.E.2d at 519 (1984).
7. See Petroski v. Northern Indiana Pub. Serv. Co., 171 Ind. App. 14, 354 N.E.2d 736
(1976) (fourteen-year-old boy injured when he touched an electric line while climbing a tree).
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presented with similar factual circumstances on electrically caused
injuries is the variety of ways in which courts have classified and
defined electricity. In the United States, electricity is typically
treated either as a service or as a product. Additionally, electricity
can be considered a good, particularly once it passes through a cus-
tomer's meter. The sale of electricity is still another area of varied
interpretations. Authorities are divided as to whether there can be a
sale of electricity, and if so, whether it is sold only when it enters the
stream of commerce as it passes through a customer's meter.
This comment will examine the variety of ways in which elec-
tricity has been and is currently treated by American common law.
This comment will then consider how electricity should be treated
for the purposes of products liability. It will examine special solu-
tions that have been successfully utilized with other unique items,
such as blood transfusions. Finally, this Comment will analyze those
solutions in light of practical political realities.
II. A Brief History of the Treatment of Electricity
Ballentine's Law Dictionary defines electricity as "a subtle
agency that pervades all space and evades successful definition."'
This definition aptly describes the historical as well as current treat-
ment of electricity in the United States.
In the early twentieth century, many American courts ascribed
a property characteristic to electricity that enabled it to be bartered
or sold. Alluding to the difficulty of defining electricity, a California
court stated:
It may be regarded as a solecism to say that one may own a
thing not susceptible of definition and the nature and character
of which is practically unknown, yet when one gathers from the
elements an energy or force which he may store, transmit, and
utilize, he thereby appropriates to his own use that thing,
whatever it may be, and it is a subject of ownership, of barter
and sale, so long as it is in possession.'
Another early twentieth century court also found that electricity,
like natural gas, could be bought and sold.
It is true that electricity is no longer, as formerly, regarded
by electricians as a fluid, but its manifestations and effects, like
8. BALLENTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY 395 (3d ed. 1969), quoted in Farina v. Niagara
Mohawk Power Corp., 81 A.D.2d 700, 438 N.Y.S.2d 645, 647 (1981).
9. Terrace Water Co. v. San Antonio Light & Power Co., I Cal. App. 511, 513, 82 P.
562, 563 (1905).
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those of gas, may be seen and felt . . . Electricity, the same as
gas, is a valuable article of merchandise, bought and sold like
other personal property and is capable of appropriation by
another. o
The New Jersey Supreme Court articulated the nature of electricity
as property or a commodity. In Sixty-Seventh South Munn v. Board
of Public Utility Commissioners, it stated that "[i]t is an accepted
proposition that electric current is property, and it is admitted for
the purposes of this case that it is a commodity .. .".'I The accept-
ance by these early courts of the proposition that electricity is a
property or commodity that can be bought or sold was perhaps an
indication that later courts-would consider electricity as a product or
good, a form that would enable them to conclude that electric com-
panies should be strictly liable for damages arising from the sale of
their product.
Although present day courts continue to debate whether elec-
tricity is a commodity,1" the debate among American courts earlier
10. People v. Menagas, 367 Il1. 330, 337, II N.E.2d 403, 407 (1937).
I1. Sixty-Seven South Munn, Inc. v. Board of Pub. Util. Comm., 106 N.J. 45, 47, 147
A. 735, 736 (1929), aft'd, 107 N.J.L. 386, 152 A. 920 (1930), cert. denied, 283 U.S. 828
(1981).
12. Courts continue to debate whether electricity is a commodity subject to the pricing
restrictions of the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13(a), which outlaws price discrimina-
tion "between purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality." This discussion of elec-
tricity as a commodity for such industries as cable television may have implications for
whether electricity is a product for purposes of strict product liability as discussed further at
infra notes 19-33 and accompanying text. For those cases holding electricity to be a commod-
ity, see City of Kirkwood v. Union Elec. Co., 671 F.2d 1173, 1181 (8th Cir. 1982) ("Though
the Robinson-Patman Act does not cover sales or real property, intangibles, or services, elec-
tricity does not fall into any of these categories. Electric power can be felt, if not touched. It is
produced, sold, stored in small quantities, transmitted, and distributed in discrete quantities.");
Town of Concord, Mass. v. Boston Edison Co., 676 F. Supp. 396, 398 (D. Mass. 1988)
("[Ellectricity is not significantly different from other items deemed commodities subject to
the price discrimination prohibitions of the antitrust laws. Like the more traditional commodi-
ties, electrical energy is a thing bought and sold in the market place."); Borough of Elwood
City, Pa. v. Pennsylvania Power Co., 570 F. Supp. 553, 561 (W.D. Pa. 1983); City of Gains-
ville v. Florida Power & Light Co., 488 F. Supp. 1258, 1281-82 (S.D. Fla. 1980) ("Electricity
is a product manufactured from other forms of energy . . . . [T]he distribution of electricity
often involves multi-level sales from supplier to retailer." Due to the possibility of discrimina-
tory pricing in the sale and distribution of electricity, electricity should be considered a com-
modity within the scope of the Robinson-Patman Act.). But see Rankin County Cablevision v.
Pearl River Valley Water Supply Dist., 692 F. Supp. 691, 693 (S.D. Miss. 1988) (nature of
providing cable television is providing entertainment, a service not a commodity); Satellite T.
Assoc. v. Continental Cablevision of Va., 586 F. Supp. 973, 976 (E.D. Va. 1982) (primary
purpose of cable television industry is providing a service while "the equipment and machinery
[and electricity] necessary to provide cable television is merely incidental to providing the
entertainment service"), affid, 714 F.2d 351 (4th Cir. 1983); City of Groton v. Connecticut
Light & Power Co., 497 F. Supp. 1040, 1052 n.14 (D. Conn. 1980); City of Newark v.
Delmarva Power & Light Co., 476 F. Supp. 763, 774 (D. Del. 1979) (Commodities, as used in
the Robinson-Patman Act, are "synonymous with 'goods, wares or merchandise.' These terms
are not commonly applied to electric power.").
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in this century centered on the duty of care that electric companies
owed to their customers in negligence actions. Some courts consid-
ered electricity to be a dangerous force that imposed a high duty of
care on the companies."3 Other courts ruled that, although electric
utilities were not insurers of public safety, they were liable for dam-
ages arising from their negligence. 4 Still others were hesitant to im-
pose any liability. They held that electric utilities were not insurers
of public safety, and that reasonable men were expected to know the
dangers of electricity.' 5
Departing from a reliance upon only traditional negligence,
some courts eventually began to treat electricity within the concept
of res ipsa loquitor.'6 Later, with the advent of strict products liabil-
ity in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.,' electricity has been
suggested as an appropriate area for application of the doctrine of
strict products liability.' 8 In order to be included within the confines
of strict liability, however, electricity must be first defined as a prod-
uct, and all courts are not willing to do so.
13. See San Juan Light & Transit Co. v. Requena, 224 U.S. 89, 97 (1912); Giraudi v.
Elec. Improvement Co., 107 Cal. 120, 124, 40 P. 108, 109 (1895); Kentucky Util. Co. v.
Woodrum's Admr., 224 Ky. 33, 38-39, 5 S.W.2d 283, 286 (1928); Anderson v. Eastern Minn.
Power Co., 197 Minn. 144, 149, 266 N.W. 702, 704 (1936); Collins v. Virginia Power & Elec.
Co., 204 N.C. 320, - 168 S.E. 500, 504 (1933); Hetrick v. Marion-Reserve Power Co.,
141 Ohio St. 347, 355, 48 N.E.2d 103, 107 (1943). For a history of the treatment of electricity
by California courts, see generally Comment, Shocks, Shorts and Sparks-Strict Liability for
Electric Utilities, 20 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 973, 979-90 (1987) [hereinafter Shocks, Shorts and
Sparks]; Comment, Torts of Electric Utilities: Can Strict Liability be Plugged In?, II Loy.
L.A.L. REV. 775, 777-78 (1978) [hereinafter Torts of Electric Utilities]; Note, Strict Liability
of Suppliers of Electricity is the Current Trend: Pierce v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 13 W. ST. U.
L. REV. 345 (1985) [hereinafter Current Trend].
14. For a balanced view on both the dangers of electricity and the limitations on respon-
sibility of the utility, see Kentucky Util. Co., 224 Ky. at 38-39, 5 S.W.2d at 286. See also
Lebow v. Missouri Pub. Serv. Co., 270 S.W.2d 713, 715 (Mo. 1954); Henneke v. Gasconade
Power Co., 236 Mo. App. 100, 152 S.W.2d 667 (1941); Tex. Util. Co. v. Dear, 64 S.W.2d 807
(Tex. Civ. App. 1933).
15. For a viewpoint advocating a greater responsibility for plaintiffs, see Austin v. Public
Serv. Co., 299 11. 112, 114, 132 N.E.458, 460-62 (1921); Hamilton v. Laclede Elec. Coop.,
294 S.W.2d 11, 15 (Mo. 1956).
16. See San Juan Light & Transit Co., 224 U.S. at 98-99 (1911); Phillips v. Southern
Cal. Edison Co., 23 Cal. App. 2d 222, 72 P.2d 769 (1937); Anderson, 197 Minn. at 149, 266
N.W. at 705; Henneke, 236 Mo. App. at -, 152 S.W.2d at 672-73; Collins, 204 N.C. at
-, 168 S.E. at 504-05; Alexander v. Nanticoke Light Co., 209 Pa. 571, 58 A. 1068 (1904);
Texas Util. Co., 64 S.W.2d at 811.
17. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
18. See Pierce v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 166 Cal. App. 3d 68, 212 Cal. Rptr. 283
(1985); Schriner v. Pennsylvania Power & Light Co., 348 Pa. Super. 177, 501 A.2d 1128
(1985); Ransome v. Wisconsin Elec. Power Co., 87 Wis. 2d 605, 275 N.W.2d 641 (1979).
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III. The Disparate Definitions of Electricity Among Current Amer-
ican Courts
The definitional problem of electricity has been a difficult one
indeed. Electricity has been defined as a product, a service, a good
and a sale, and there is much disagreement about which of these
concepts adequately encompasses it. Although some courts consider
electricity to be a service, others contend it is a product. Even those
courts that define electricity as a product differ on when electricity
should be so defined.
A. Electricity as a Service or a Product
The Wisconsin Supreme Court, in Ransome v. Wisconsin Elec-
tric Power Co., 9 defined electricity as a product for the purposes of
strict product liability. It stated:
"[Ellectricity" . . . is a form of energy that can be made or
produced by men, confined, controlled, transmitted and distrib-
uted to be used as an energy source for heat, power and light
and is distributed in the stream of commerce. The distribution
might well be a service, but the electricity itself, in the contem-
plation of the ordinary user, is a consumable product."
Within that definition of electricity as a product, however, the court
created a significant exception by limiting its application to the point
when electricity is no longer in transmission but enters the con-
sumer's meter box." In decisions following Ransome, California and
Pennsylvania adopted the interpretation that electricity could be a
product once it reached the consumer."
In Houston Lighting and Power Co. v. Reynolds,2" a Texas
court took a somewhat different view that "[e]lectricity cannot be
19. 87 Wis. 2d 605, 275 N.W.2d 641 (1979).
20. Id. at 610, 275 N.W.2d at 643.
21. Id.
22. See Pierce, 166 Cal. App. 3d at 82, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 290 ("[E]lectricity delivered
to homes and businesses is a 'product.' "); Schriner, 348 Pa. Super. at 189, 501 A.2d at 1134
("[While still in the distribution system, electricity is a service, not a product; electricity only
becomes a product, for purposes of strict liability, once it passes through the customer's meter
and into the stream of commerce."). See also Carbone v. Connecticut Light & Power Co., 40
Conn. Supp. 120 482 A.2d 722 (1984); Mallor, Utility "Services" Under the Uniform Com-
mercial Code: Are Public Utilities in For a Shock?, 56 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 89 (1980);
Shocks, Shorts and Sparks, supra note 13, at 991. See generally M. SHAPO, THE LAW OF
PRODUCTS LIABILITY, § 7.03[3] at 7-10 through 7-12 (1987); Annotation, Products Liability:
Electricity, 60 A.L.R. 4TH 732, 742-47 (1988) [hereinafter Products Liability: Electricity].
23. 712 S.W.2d 761 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986), rev'd, No. 126108 (Tex. Nov. 30, 1988)
(WESTLAW, States library, TX file).
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separated from its distribution system," and that "the consumer not
only purchases a product, the electricity, but in addition, the trans-
portation of the product to the consumer's home, a service." '24 The
court concluded that the electricity itself was indeed a product.
Electricity is a form of energy that can be made or pro-
duced by man, confined, controlled, transmitted, and distributed
to be used as an energy source for heat, power, and light and is
distributed in the stream of commerce. While the distribution of
the electricity through a system of towers, poles and wires may
well be considered a service, the electricity itself is a consumable
product."'
Although the courts in the Wisconsin and Texas camps disagree as
to the status of electricity at differing points in its distribution sys-
tem, the language used by both camps to describe the nature of elec-
tricity as both a service and a product is quite similar. It reflects the
difficulty which courts have had in defining the evasive concept of
electricity.
Consistent with Ransome's reasoning that electricity should be
considered a product once it enters a customer's home is the notion
that electricity is a service while it is in a transmission line.2 6 Based
on this disparate treatment of electricity within the definition of
product, it is not surprising that another Texas court has treated
electricity as a service, regardless of whether it is in transmission
lines or has reached a consumer's meter box.2 In Navarro City
Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Prince,28 the court stated that, since
there is no way to "adequately package or label electrical energy,"
its sale should be "termed the rendition of a service. "29
Other courts have agreed that the wires carrying the electricity
are not the packaging for a product. In Farino v. Niagara Mohawk
Corp.,30 a New York court found that "claimed defects in the cable
carrying the electrical current are insufficient to establish liability
because the cable is not 'packaging' for the current .... "i' Al-
24. Id. at 766-67.
25. Id. at 766.
26. See Schriner, 348 Pa. Super. at 187, 501 A.2d at 1134; Thibos v. Pacific Gas &
Elec. Co., 187 Cal. App. 3d 337, 232 Cal. Rptr. 11 (1986); Smith v. Home Light and Power
Co., 734 P.2d 1051 (Colo. 1987); Otte v. Dayton Power & Light Co., 37 Ohio St. 3d 33, 523
N.E.2d 835 (1988). See generally Products Liability: Electricity, supra note 22, at 748-50.
27. Navarro County Elec. Coop., v. Prince, 640 S.W.2d 398, 400 (Tex. Ct. App. 1982).
28. Id. at 400.
29. Id.
30. 81 A.D.2d 700, 438 N.Y.S.2d 645 (1981).
31. Id. at 700, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 646.
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though the Illinois Supreme Court, in Genaust v. Illinois Power
Co.,32 assumed that electricity is a product, it did not believe that
the wires are its "packaging. '"38
B. Electricity as a "Good"
Electricity's disparate treatment as a service or a product is
mirrored in its varied treatment by the states' commercial codes. The
Uniform Commercial Code states: "'[g]oods' means all things (in-
cluding specially manufactured goods) which are movable at the
time of identification to the contract for sale other than the money in
which the price is to be paid, investment securities . . . and things in
action." ' 4 Further, the Code also provides that "[g]oods must be
both existing and identified before any interest in them can pass.""
Several courts have identified electricity as a good. In adopting
the U.C.C. definition of a good, the Indiana Court of Appeals stated
in Helvey v. Wabash Co. REMC6 that electricity, when it is deliv-
ered to a customer, is a good because it qualifies as a movable, ex-
isting thing. 37 Later, the same court in Hedges v. Public Service Co.
of Indiana3 8 found that electricity in transmission, as opposed to de-
livery, is not a good within the definition of the U.C.C. 9
This transmission/delivery distinction has been recognized by
32. 62 Ill. 2d 456, 463, 343 N.E.2d 465, 469 (1976).
33. Id. at 463-64, 343 N.E.2d at 469-70.
34. U.C.C. § 2-105(1) (1988).
35. U.C.C. § 2-105(2) (1988).
36. 151 Ind. App. 176, 278 N.E.2d 608 (1972).
37. The court elaborated further on its definition of "goods."
It is necessary for goods to be (1) a thing; (2) existing; and (3) movable
with (2) and (3) existing simultaneously. We are of the opinion that electricity
qualifies in each respect, . . . if for no other reason than the monthly reminder
from the electric company of how much current has passed through the meter.
Logic would indicate that whatever can be measured in order to establish the
price to be paid would be indicative of fulfilling both the existing and movable
requirements of goods.
Id. at -, 278 N.E.2d at 610. See Annotation, Electricity. Gas, or Water Furnished by
Public Utility as "Goods" within Provisions of Uniform Commercial Code, Article 2 on
Sales, 48 A.L.R. 3D 1060, 1061-62 (1973). See generally Products Liability: Electricity, supra
note 22, at 742-48.
38. 396 N.E.2d 933 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979).
39. The court explained its reasoning in Helvey and Hedges.
The high-voltage electricity with which the Hedges came into contact was
not the good PSI was intending to sell or the Hedges were intending to buy.
While the delivery of 135 volts of electricity under the circumstances in Helvey
can be considered the sale of a defective good, the tragic escape of 7200 volts
from the transmission wire, through the ladder, and into the bodies of these men
is not a transaction in goods intended to be covered by the Uniform Commercial
Code.
Id. at 936.
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other courts as well. In Cincinnati Gas & Electric Co. v. Goebel,40
the Ohio court stated: "[w]e distinguish electricity in its raw state
from metered amounts passing through utility-owned conduits and
into the homes of consumers. The latter-described form of electricity
is 'goods' as defined in the Uniform Commercial Code."' 1
Indeed, the majority of courts refuse to define electricity as a
good when it is in transmission. In Navarro County Electric Cooper-
ative v. Prince,' for example, the court relied upon the definition of
good in the Texas Business and Commerce Code."1 As in the Uni-
form Commercial Code, Article 2.314 of the Texas Business and
Commerce Code provided, inter alia, that for goods to be merchant-
able, they must be of fair average quality, and that they must be
"adequately contained, packaged and labeled as the agreement may
require . . ."'" The court then examined the legislative intent of
these statutes'5 and concluded that "rather than be classified as
goods, the sale of electric energy would be more fittingly termed the
rendition of a service."' 6 The Navarro court held that "the transmis-
sion of electrical energy along high tension power lines . . . is not
goods within the meaning of Section 2.314 of the Business and Com-
merce Code.""'
In similar fashion, courts in both Michigan
48 and New York49
have found that while electricity is in transmission, it is not a good
under the Uniform Commercial Code. In Williams v. Detroit
Edison, °5  a Michigan court addressed a set of facts in which a back
hoe struck a power line causing it to fall on a workman. The court
stated that electricity is not "a tangible item like an automobile,
40. 28 Ohio Misc. 2d 4, 502 N.E.2d 713 (1986).
41. Id. at ., 502 N.E.2d at 715.
42. 640 S.W.2d 398 (Tex. Ct. App. 1982).
43. Id. at 399-400.
44. id.
45. The court construed the legislative intent as follows:
[I]t was the intention of the Legislature in passing this act to confine its applica-
bility to tangible manufactured or produced products which might normally be
found in bulk quantity or in packaged goods. When applying those requirements
to electrical energy it certainly could not be classified as fungible goods nor is




48. See Williams v. Detroit Edison Co., 63 Mich. App. 559, 564, 234 N.W.2d 702, 705
(1975); Buckeye Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Detroit Edison Co., 38 Mich. App. 325, 328, 196
N.W.2d 316, 317 (1972).
49. See Farino v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 81 A.D. 2d 700, 701, 438 N.Y.S.2d
645, 647 (1981) ("[W]e are unable to conclude that it was intended that electricity be in-
cluded within the definition of 'goods' (U.C.C., § 2-105).")).
50. 63 Mich. App. 559, 234 N.W.2d 702 (1975).
ELECTRIFYING SOLUTIONS
punch press or Coca-Cola bottle. Rather, it is a form of energy
which in this case consisted of 7600 volts traveling in an uncovered
line about 28 feet above the ground. Electricity is a service rather
than a 'good' . . . ."" In another Michigan case in which a house
fire was started by electricity,5" 2 it appeared that the electricity had
actually entered a customer's home and could therefore be consid-
ered a product. Witnesses for the plaintiff, however, testified that
they saw "a glow move from defendant's transformer down to the
plaintiff's house at which time they heard a 'foom' sound. [The]
[p]laintiff's expert witness testified that the phenomenon .. .could
have been an electrical arc."53 Thus, the court found that the elec-
tricity was still within the transmission line, and the electricity was
not a good as defined by the Uniform Commercial Code. 4
Thus, it seems well-settled that electricity is not a good while it
is in transmission. Those courts that have found electricity to be a
good have done so because the electricity had passed through the
customer's meter. Any disparity in electricity's treatment as a good
therefore seems based upon when the damage occurs.
C. The "Sale" of Electricity
The same cannot be said about the disparity of treatment sur-
rounding the sale of electricity. The Uniform Commercial Code
states that a "'sale' consists in the passing of title from the seller to
the buyer for a price."55 Generally, a "sale" of electricity occurs
when electricity enters the stream of commerce as it passes through
a customer's meter. Nevertheless, there is some disagreement over
the timing of the sale and whether passage into a customer's meter is
equivalent to entrance into the stream of commerce.
As discussed previously, electricity had been historically treated
as having the capacity to be bartered and sold.56 In later years,
courts elaborated on a test for determining whether electricity had
indeed been sold. They determined that possession or control of elec-
51. Id. at 564, 234 N.W.2d at 705.
52. Buckeye, 38 Mich. App. at 325, 196 N.W.2d at 316.
53. Id. at 331, 196 N.W. at 318-19.
54. Id. at 328, 196 N.W. at 317.
55. U.C.C. § 2-106(1) (1988).
56. Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton Corp. v. Superior Court, 208 Cal. App. 2d 803, 819, 25
Cal. Rptr. 798, 809 (1962) ("Electricity is a commodity which, like other goods, can be manu-
factured, transported and sold."); People v. Menagas, 367 III. 330, 337, 11 N.E.2d 403, 407
(1937) (Electricity "is a valuable article of merchandise, bought and sold like other personal
property."); Terrace Water Co. v. San Antonio Light & Power Co., 1 Cal. App. 511, 513, 82
P. 562, 653 (1905) (Electricity "is a subject of ownership, of barter and sale, so long as it is in
possession.").
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tricity was determinative of whether a sale had taken place.
For example, in 1969, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin in
Kemp v. Wisconsin Electric Power Co.,5 7 declared that, when a boy
was burned after his model airplane had touched a transmission line,
the electricity that injured the boy had not been sold because it was
still in control of the electric utility.58 Similarly, in Genaust v. Illi-
nois Power Co.," the Illinois Supreme Court found that, when an
electrical contractor was injured while he was installing an antenna
atop a tower, the "power wires were not sold to any consumer, but
were owned and controlled by Illinois Power . . . .It is obvious that
the high-voltage electricity in question remained in the control of
Illinois Power and was neither delivered nor sold to any consumer." 60
Thus, the Supreme Courts in both Illinois and Wisconsin agreed that
while electricity was in a transmission line, it was still within the
control of the utility company and thus had not yet been sold to a
consumer. While deciding that electricity is not yet sold when it was
in the transmission line, these courts left open the question of when
electricity is sold.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court eventually answered that ques-
tion in Ransome v. Wisconsin Electric Power Co.6" The Ransome
court held that "[t]he 'sale' of electricity takes place at the meter
where charges are generally computed." 2 Similarly, in Wivagg v.
Duquesne Light Co.,6" in which a surge of high voltage entered a
brick dwelling causing a fire, a Pennsylvania trial court held that
"the transaction involved herein is sufficiently analogous to a 'sale'
"64
Finally, in Farina v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp.,65 a New
York court equated the sale of electricity with its placement in the
stream of commerce. It stated that electricity "is not sold to the con-
sumer, and remains owned by and under the control of the utility
.; until actually delivered, the electricity has not been placed into
the 'stream of commerce' . "...66 Based on this reasoning, the
court found that there had been no sale in this case when an individ-
57. 44 Wis. 2d 571, 172 N.W.2d 161 (1969).
58. Id. at 583, 172 N.W.2d at 166.
59. 62 Ill. 2d 456, 343 N.E.2d 465 (1976).
60. Id. at 464-65, 343 N.E.2d at 470.
61. 87 Wis. 2d 605, 275 .W.2d 641 (1979).
62. Id. at 610, 275 N.W.2d at 643.
63. 73 Pa. D & C.2d 694 (1975).
64. Id. at 702.
65. 81 A.D.2d 700, 438 N.Y.S.2d 645 (1981).
66. Id. at 700, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 646.
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ual was killed after the antenna he was removing from a roof
touched a transmission line.6"
Other courts have relied on Farina's "stream of commerce" lan-
guage and focused upon electricity's placement in the stream of com-
merce, rather than upon its sale, in deciding liability issues.68 For
example, in Petroski v. Northern Indiana Public Service Co.,6" the
court declared that "the test is not whether there has been a techni-
cal sale but rather whether the product has been placed in the
stream of commerce.""0 The court held that electricity was not yet in
the stream of commerce when it was in a transmission line.
7 1
Similarly, citing Petroski, a New Jersey court, in Aversa v.
Public Service Electric & Gas Co.,72 stated that,
[W]hile a sale is sufficient to place a product into the stream of
commerce, a sale is not an absolute prerequisite to a finding that
a product has been placed in the stream of commerce. Electric-
ity may enter the stream of commerce when the electric com-
pany relinquished exclusive control over its product.
7 3
The Aversa court added that, while a sale conclusively places a prod-
uct in the stream of commerce, if a utility relinquishes control over
electricity prior to its running through a meter, strict liability may
be established.
7 4
One court, however, has expressly rejected the stream of com-
merce basis for imposition of strict liability for accidents involving
electricity. In Smithbower v. Southwestern Central Rural Electric
Cooperative,75 three men died when their portable grain auger came
into contact with a high voltage overhead transmission line.7" Be-
cause the electricity had been sold from an electric company, Penn-
sylvania Electric, to a rural cooperative, Southwest Central, it could
be argued that the electricity had been placed in the stream of com-
merce. The court concluded, however, that since the electricity had
67. Id. at 700-01, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 646-47. See Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co. v. Goebel,
28 Ohio Misc. 2d 4, -, 502 N.E.2d 713, 715 (1986).
68. Farina, 81 A.D.2d at 700, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 646.
69. 171 Ind. App. 14, 354 N.E.2d 736 (1976).
70. Id. at __, 354 N.E.2d at 747 ("The electric company's transmission and distribu-
tion lines are not a part of the end product which reaches the consumer as in the case of
bottles and cans which are a part of the finished product.").
71. Id. at __, 354 N.E.2d at 739, 747.
72. 186 N.J. Super. 130, 451 A.2d 976 (1982).
73. Id. at 136-37, 451 A.2d at 980 (citing Petroski, 171 Ind. App. at -, 354 N.E.2d
at 747).
74. 186 N.J. Super. 130, 137, 451 A.2d 976, 980 (1982).
75. 374 Pa. Super. 86, 542 A.2d 140 (1988).
76. Id. at 48, 542 A.2d at 141.
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not yet been sold to the customer by passing through his meter when
the injury occurred, a sale for the purposes of strict product liability
had not yet occurred.7
Therefore, although most courts have concluded that a sale of
electricity occurs after electricity passes through a customer's meter
into the stream of commerce, others are willing to draw a distinction
between the sale of electricity and its placement into the stream of
commerce. In either approach, control over the electricity remains a
crucial factor.
Also critical are the questions raised by Smithbower. Since sig-
nificant amounts of this nation's electricity are sold by one electric
company to another, courts may follow the lead of Smithbower and
draw a distinction between the sale of electricity among electric
companies and the sale of electricity between an electric company
and a consumer.7 8
Ultimately, these definitions of sale, good, product and service
are important, however, because product liability theories depend on
whether there has been a sale of a product.
IV. The Disparate Treatment of Electricity Within Product Liabil-
ity Law
In recent years, electricity has been treated in accord with the
following product liability theories: negligence, strict liability in tort,
and strict liability for an implied warranty.7 While some courts
have held that electric utilities should not be held strictly liable,
other have been willing to impose such liability. In many cases, the
willingness of courts to do so depends upon whether they classify
electricity as a product, a service, or a good. As noted previously, the
location of the electricity, whether in the transmission lines or in the
customers meter, is determinative.
A. Negligence Theories of Liability for Electricity-Caused
Accidents
Negligence theories utilize the following four elements for a
77. Smithbower, 374 Pa. Super. at 54, 542 A.2d at 144.
78. See Smithbower, 374 Pa. Super. at 54, 542 A.2d at 144. In this context, perhaps the
concept of electricity entering the stream of commerce when it reaches the consumer is more
realistic than deciding when and for what purposes the supplying of electricity should be con-
sidered a sale. For a discussion of the sale of electricity among different electric companies,
termed "wheeling," see generally PUBLIC UTILITIES REPORTS, PUR GUIDE Supplement IV at
3-4 (1985) [hereinafter PUR GUIDE].
79. For a discussion of liability theories, see generally W. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEE-
TON ON TORTS § 95 (1984) [hereinafter PROSSER].
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cause of action: duty, breach of duty, causation and damages." This
comment will consider in detail the first three of these elements.
Although some disagreement exists about the duty electric utili-
ties owe consumers," most courts are willing to impose upon utilities
a high degree of care, commensurate with the risk of injury or poten-
tial damage of electricity.82 They often require utilities to "use the
highest degree of care to prevent injury which it could reasonably
anticipate."83 Specifically, these courts have held that electric utili-
ties should protect the public by either isolating or insulating electric
wires.8"
Although courts are willing to impose a high duty of care on
electric utilities, many are not willing to make utilities insurers of
public safety.85 Therefore, they have held that an electric company's
80. See generally id. at § 30.
81. For courts which hold electric utilities to a high duty of care, see Gelinas v. New
England Power Company, 359 Mass. 119, -_, 268 N.E.2d 336, 339 (1971) ("Our decisions
have long recognized that the dangers inherent in electricity have a bearing on the degree of
care required in its use . . . [I]nasmuch as electricity is a highly dangerous force, those em-
ploying it are properly held to a correspondingly high degree of care in its use."); Phelps v.
Magnavox Co., 62 Tenn. App. 578, 466 S.W.2d 226 (1970). But see Vincent v. Public Serv.
Co., 129 N.H. 621, 624, 529 A.2d 397, 398 (1987) ("It is, of course, common knowledge that
electricity is dangerous. Therefore, consumers of electricity are expected to exercise care when
they use it."); Cratsley v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 38 111. App. 3d 55, 60, 347 N.E.2d 496,
501 (1976) ("[Tlhe reasonable man is presumed to know of the electrical force found in trans-
mission wires").
82. See Ruhs v. Pacific Power & Light, 671 F.2d 1268 (10th Cir. 1982); Citerella v.
United Illuminating Co., 158 Conn. 600, 607, 266 A.2d 382, 386 (1969); Simon v. Southwest-
ern Louisiana Elec. Membership Corp., 390 So. 2d 1265, 1267 (La. 1980); Eastern Shore Pub.
Serv. Co. v. Corbett, 227 Md. 411, 425, 177 A.2d 701, 709 (1962); Lebow v. Missouri Pub.
Serv. Co., 270 S.W.2d 713, 715 (Mo. 1954); Bosley v. Central Vermont Pub. Serv. Corp., 127
Vt. 581, -, 255 A.2d 671, 673 (1969).
83. Donovan v. Union Elec. Co., 454 S.W.2d 623, 626 (Mo. App. 1970). Accord Mrad
v. Missouri Edison Co., 649 S.W.2d 936, 941 (Mo. App. 1983) ("The test of foreseeability of
injury in these cases is whether, in the exercise of the highest degree of care, the electric
company reasonably could have anticipated that some injury was likely to have occurred to one
lawfully near its transmission line."). See also Nelson v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 124 Ill.
App. 3d 655, 662-63, 465 N.E.2d 513, 519 (1984); Simon, 390 So. 2d at 1267.
84. See Austin v. Riverside Portland Cement Co., 44 Cal. 2d 225, 232, 282 P.2d 69, 73
(1955) ("[W]ires carrying electricity must be carefully and properly insulated by those main-
taining them at all places where there is a reasonable probability of injury to persons or prop-
erty therefrom."); Anderson v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 77 Cal. App. 328, 337, 246 P. 559,
562 (1926) ("Either the wires must be insulated or at least placed beyond the danger line of
contact with human beings."); Simon, 390 So. 2d at 1267 ("If it should be reasonably antici-
pated that persons may come into contact with electric lines, the operator of those lines is
required to insulate them, or to give adequate warnings of the danger, or to take other proper
and reasonable precautions to prevent injury."). See also Donovan, 454 S.W.2d at 626; Mrad,
649 S.W.2d at 941; Alabama Power Co. v. Alexander, 370 So. 2d 252, 254 (Ala. 1979).
Of course, the propriety of the use of exposed high voltage wires depends upon their loca-
tion. See Rice v. Florida Power & Light Co., 363 So. 2d 834, 838 (Fla. App. 1978).
85. See Sessums v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 652 F.2d 579, 581-83 (5th Cir. 1981),
cert. denied 455 U.S. 948 (1982); Martin v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 546 F. Supp. 780,
781-84 (E.D. La. 1982); Alabama Power Co., 370 So.2d at 254; Wertz v. Holy Cross Elec.
Light, 512 P.2d 286, 288 (Colo. Ct. App. 1973); Citerella v. United Illuminating Co., 158
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liability, if any, must be based on principles of negligence."6 Apply-
ing such principles, courts have found that a reasonable person
should be aware of the dangers of electricity and take steps to avoid
contact with exposed electricity, whether in the home or in transmis-
sion lines.8 7 In such a context, it is debatable whether an electric
utility has a duty to warn of dangers, and if so, what that duty
entails. 88
Another duty incumbent upon electric utilities is a duty to pro-
vide continuous electric service.89 Electricity must be ready at the
flip of a switch.90 As a result of a brownout or blackout, some courts
have found electric utilities liable for failure to provide adequate ser-
vice or warn their customers of impending reductions in power.9
Other courts have disagreed, however, holding that utilities are not
insurers of continuous service.92
Conn. 600, 607, 266 A.2d 382, 386 (1969); Plourde v. Hartford Elec. Light Co., 31 Conn.
Sup. 192, 326 A.2d 848 (1974); Simon, 390 So. 2d at 1268; Eastern Shore Pub. Serv. Co. v.
Corbett, 227 Md. 411, 425, 177 A.2d 701, 709 (1962) ("The courts and text-writers, in this
country are in very general accord that electric companies are not insurers."); Lieser v. N.
States Power Co., 268 Minn. 95, 105, 128 N.W.2d 292, 299 (1965); Rodgers v. Chimney
Rock Pub. Power Dist., 216 Neb. 666, -, 345 N.W.2d 12, 16 (1984); Bates v. Cleveland
Elec. Illuminating Co., - Ohio App.2d - , - , 171 N.E.2d 548, 552 (1961); Erwin,
505 S.W.2d at 355 (The high duty of care owed by an electric utility does not "make the
supplier of electricity an insurer."); Bosley v. Central Vermont Pub. Serv. Corp., 127 Vt. 581,
-, 255 A.2d 671, 673 (1969).
86. See Sessums, 652 F.2d at 582 ("[P]ower company liability in Louisiana must rest
on a showing of negligence."); Hamilton v. Laclede Elec. Coop., 294 S.W.2d I1, 15 (Mo.
1956) ("An electric utility is not an insurer of the safety of persons. Its liability rests upon the
rules of negligence."); Lorence v. Omaha Pub. Power Dist., 191 Neb. 68, -, 214 N.W.2d
238, 240 (1974).
87. See Hamilton, 294 S.W.2d at 17; Citerella, 158 Conn. at 605, 610, 266 A.2d at
385, 387; Lorence, 191 Neb. at -, 214 N.W.2 at 241 ("The lack of ordinary care by the
plaintiff is self-evident . . . . the plaintiff failed to exercise ordinary care for his own safety.");
Vincent v. Public Serv. Co., 129 N.H. 621, 624, 529 A.2d 397, 398 (1987).
88. See Simon, 390 So. 2d at 1268; Koehler v. Detroit Edison Co., 383 Mich. 224, 231,
174 N.W.2d 827, 831 (1970); Vieths v. Ripley, 295 N.W.2d 659, 663 (Minn. 1980); Gallas v.
Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 56 N.J. 101, 109-10, 265 A.2d 377, 381 (1970) ("[A] jury
question exists as to whether failure of the power company to post signs on the poles or the
uninsulated wires warning persons engaged in such lawful operation [as the construction of a
steel water tank] of the hazard of contact with them.").
89. See National Food Stores, Inc. v. Union Elec. Co., 494 S.W.2d 379, 381 (Mo. App.
1973) ("[Aln electric power company which undertakes to supply current, although not an
insurer of service, has an obligation to provide a patron with adequate and continuous service
..... "). See generally Bouknight & Raskin, Planning for Wholesale Customer Loads in a
Competitive Environment: The Obligation to Provide Wholesale Service Under the Federal
Power Act, 8 ENERGY L.J. 237 (1987); Annotation, Liability of Electric Power or Light Com-
pany to Patron for Interruption, Failure, or Inadequacy of Power, 4 A.L.R. 3D 594 (1965).
90. Elgin Airport Inn v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 89 I11. 2d 138, 141, 432 N.E.2d
259, 260 (1982).
91. See National Food Stores, 494 S.W.2d at 383; Food Pageant, Inc. v. Consolidated
Edison Co., 54 N.Y.2d 167, 172-73, 429 N.E.2d 738, 740-41, 445 N.Y.S.2d 60, 62 (1981).
92. See Senderoff v. Housatonic Public Serv. Co., 147 Conn. 18, 20, 156 A.2d 517, 518
(1959); Lee v. Consolidated Edison Co., 98 Misc. 2d 304, 413 N.Y.S.2d 826 (1978).
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When a utility fails to provide service, fails to warn a consumer
or fails to foresee a possible injury, courts will consider whether the
utility has breached its duty to the public and its customers. In mak-
ing this determination, they will consider evidence that a utility
failed to take necessary precautions for public safety. For example,
in Gelinas v. New England Power Co.,9a the Supreme Court of Mas-
sachusetts found evidence that "there was a broken strand hanging
from one of the defendant's live overhead wires" that enabled the
electric current to arc to a nearby conveyor and ultimately cause the
plaintiff's injuries.94 Because the court found that "[t]he jury could
also properly conclude that by reason of the length of that broken
strand it had been broken for a sufficiently long period to have been
observed or discovered and remedied by the defendant before the
plaintiff was injured,"9 " it is similar to the logic employed by an ear-
lier Massachusetts Supreme Court in determining liability based
upon the color of a banana lying on the floor." Thus, the longer
electric lines have been in disrepair, the more willing courts are to
find that the electric company should have inspected and repaired
them.97
An electric company's failure to inspect its lines or to respond to
customer requests to repair its lines may possibly lead to liability
based on gross negligence, 98 as can failure to provide adequate elec-
tric service. 9 Further, courts have found gross negligence when com-
panies have failed to "comply with a company's own safety manuals
and instructions,100 state or local safety requirements 01 or the Na-
93. 359 Mass. 119, 268 N.E.2d 336 (1971).
94. Id. at - , 268 N.E. at 340.
95. Id.
96. See Anjou v. Boston Elevated Railway Co., 208 Mass. 273, 94 N.E. 386 (1911);
Goddard v. Boston & Maine R.R. Co., 179 Mass. 52, 60 N.E. 486 (1901).
97. See Gelinas, 359 Mass. at __ , 268 N.E.2d at 340.
98. See Kulhanjian v. Detroit Edison Co., 73 Mich. App. 347, 350, 354, 251 N.W.2d
580, 582, 584 (Failure of an electric company crew to implement a program to inspect the
installation of a wire above the roof of a building was a factor in leading the court to conclude
that "the evidence was sufficient to support an instruction on plaintiff's theory that defendant
was guilty of gross negligence or willful or wanton misconduct."); Phelps v. Magnavox Co., 62
Tenn. App. 578, -, 466 S.W.2d 226, 228-29 (1970). But see Gelinas, 359 Mass. at -,
268 N.E.2d at 340 (electric utility found negligent as opposed to grossly negligent for its fail-
ure to inspect and correct a hanging wire).
99. See Food Pageant, Inc. v. Consolidated Edison Co., 54 N.Y.2d 167, 429 N.E.2d
738, 445 N.Y.S.2d 60 (1981).
100. See Kulhanjian, 73 Mich. App. at 350, 354, 251 N.W.2d at 584; Beck v. Carolina
Power & Light Co., 57 N.C. App. 373, 375, 291 S.E.2d 897, 898 (1982).
101. See Beck, 57 N.C. App. at 375, 291 S.E.2d at 898, Erwin v. Gaudalupe Valley
Elec. Coop., 505 S.W.2d 353, 356-57 (1974); Phelps, 62 Tenn. App. at -, 466 S.W.2d at
229.
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tional Electric Safety Code. 102 When a court finds a defendant liable
for gross negligence or willful and wanton negligence, it can then
impose punitive damages.
103
After determining whether the defendant company has
breached a duty, courts then analyze whether the plaintiff has estab-
lished causation. Plaintiffs must prove not only factual cause but also
proximate cause.104 Thus, plaintiffs must show that their injuries
were foreseeable.105 Although some plaintiffs have been able to prove
proximate cause, 06 the foreseeability requirement makes it very dif-
ficult for others to do So.
0 7
In light of this difficulty in proving causation, some plaintiffs
have utilized the theory of res ipsa loquitor to obtain judgment
against an electric utility. 0 8 The three requirements for proving a
res ipsa case are that 1) the event must be one which does not ordi-
narily occur in the absence of negligence; 2) the damage must be
caused by an agency or instrumentality within the exclusive control
102. See Beck, 57 N.C. App. at 375, 291 S.E.2d at 898; Phelps, 62 Tenn. App. at -,
466 S.W.2d at 229. Some courts have, in fact, held electric utilities to standards higher than
those of the National Electrical Safety Code. Rice v. Florida Power & Light Co., 363 So. 2d
834, 838 (Fla. App. 1978) ("The fact that the high voltage lines exceeded the clearance speci-
fications of the National Electrical Safety Code is not conclusive of the absence of
negligence.").
103. Beck v. Carolina Power & Light Co., 57 N.C. App. 373, 291 S.E.2d 897, 903-04
(1982).
104. See generally PROSSER, supra note 79, at § 30.
105. Id. at _ ; Nelson v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 124 II1. App. 3d 655, - , 465
N.E.2d 513, 519 (1984).
106. See Nelson, 124 Il. App. at - , 465 N.E.2d at 521; Perez v. New York City
Housing Authority, 114 Misc. 2d 1055, 452 N.Y.S.2d 510 (1982) (electric utility held liable
for a child's fall during a blackout caused by the utility), modified on other grounds, 461
N.Y.S.2d 280 (1983).
107. See Illinois Power & Light Corp. v. Hurley, 30 F.2d 905 (8th Cir.), cert. denied
280 U.S. 587 (1929).
108. One New York court has stated the reasons why plaintiffs should be permitted to
file a cause of action under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor:
Res ipsa loquitor rests upon the injustice of requiring an injured party to pro-
duce proof of negligence where the circumstances of the occurrence suggest neg-
ligence and the instrumentalities are all within the control of the defendant. It
would be a gross injustice to require the plaintiff to produce evidence that de-
fendant was negligent in the operation of its vast and complicated network,
where control of the network and all available information are peculiarly within
the province of the defendant.
Shankman v. Consolidated Edison Co., 94 Misc. 2d 150, 154, 404 N.Y.S.2d 787, 789 (1978).
For cases in which plaintiffs recovered using the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor, see Snow v.
Duke Power Co., 297 N.C. 591, 256 S.E.2d 227 (1979); Bearden v. Lyntegar Elec. Coop., 454
S.W.2d 885 (Tex. Ct. App. 1970); Cyr v. Green Mt. Power, 145 Vt. 231, 485 A.2d 1265
(1986). See also supra note 16 and accompanying text. But see Wade, On the Nature of
Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825, 826 (1973) (Although res ipsa loquitor
"often comes to the aid of the injured party ... it is normally regarded as a form of circum-
stantial evidence, and this means that there must be a logical inference of negligence which is
sufficiently strong to let the case go to the jury. This is often not present...").
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of the defendant; and 3) the damage must not have been due to any
voluntary action or contributory negligence on the part of the plain-
tiff.109 It is sometimes difficult for a plaintiff to fulfill each of these
three criteria against an electric utility. 110
If a plaintiff has proved these three criteria of res ipsa to the
satisfaction of the court, however, the burden of proof shifts to the
defendant to prove that he was not negligent."1' Thus, the defendant
may rebut the presumption of negligence with a preponderance of
the evidence." 2 Even then, however, once the plaintiff has estab-
lished the inference of negligence by meeting the three criteria of res
ipsa, this inference of negligence may remain to contradict the de-
fendant's evidence." 3
A res ipsa loquitor case may thus create problems for defend-
ant utility companies. Despite those difficulties, however, such a the-
ory is preferable for such defendants to theories of strict liability, for
which there are no rebuttable presumptions.
B. Strict Product Liability
For electricity to be subject to the requirements for strict prod-
uct liability under Section 402A of the Restatement of Torts, the
following must be true: electricity must be considered as a product; a
sale of electricity must have occurred; the electricity must be in a
defective condition and, it must be unreasonably dangerous; the
seller must be engaged in the business of selling electricity; and, fi-
nally, the electricity must reach the consumer without substantial
change from the condition in which it was sold." 4 Thus, a finding
109. See San Juan Light & Transit Co. v. Requena, 224 U.S. 89, 98-99 (1911); Snow,
297 N.C. at 599-600, 256 S.E.2d at 233; PROSSER, supra note 79, at 244.
110. See generally Annotation, Res Ipsa Loquitor as to Cause of or Liability for Real-
Property Fires, 21 A.L.R. 4TH 929, 1029-37 (1987).
111. See Bearden, 454 S.W.2d at 888 (defendant utility company failed to offer any
evidence in rebuttal for the cause of the power outage). See generally, PROSSER, supra note 79,
at § 40.
112. PROSSER, supra note 79, at § 40.
113. Prosser has examined the potential problems created in the minds of jurors.
If the defendant testifies that he used proper care to insulate his wires, . . . the
fact that electricity escaped from the wires, . . . with the background of com-
mon experience that such things do not usually happen if proper care is used,
may permit reasonable men to find that his witnesses are not be be believed, that
the precautions described were not sufficient to conform to the standard required
or were not faithfully carried out, and that the whole truth has not been told. It
is of course not impossible that proof of proper care may be so overwhelming as
to call for a directed verdict, but in the ordinary case it will not be sufficient to
destroy the inference from res ipsa loquitor.
Id. at 262.
114. See Ransome v. Wisconsin Elec. Power Co., 87 Wis. 2d 605, 617-18, 275 N.W.2d
93 DICKINSON LAW REVIEW SUMMER 1989
that electricity is a product and has been sold is usually required
before an electric utility can be held strictly liable."'
As a result of these strenuous requirements, electricity has met
all of these criteria in only a few cases.' Generally, strict liability is
not imposed while electricity is in transmission.11 7 In addition, elec-
tric companies are not held absolutely liable because electricity is
not considered to be inherently dangerous.' 8 In fact, even in a case
in which an electric utility was found strictly liable, the utility was
not held to be absolutely liable." 9
There does appear to be, however, signs of a recent trend to
641, 646-47 (1979); Schriner v. Pennsylvania Power & Light Co,, 348 Pa. Super. 177, 184-85,
4501 A.2d 1128, 1132 (1985); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
115. See supra notes 19-33, 55-78 and accompanying text. But see Public Serv. Indiana,
Inc. v. Nichols, 494 N.E.2d 349, 355-56 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986) (although electric company's
transmission lines were not part of the end product of electricity for purposes of strict liability,
the fact that cattle were damaged by stray voltage from these lines subjected utility to strict
liability); Genaust v. Illinois Power Co., 62 Ill. 2d 456, 463-65, 343 N.E.2d 465, 469-70
(1976) (accepting premise that electricity should be consistently defined, the court reasoned
that electricity was a "product" while in transmission, but that electric utilities in control of
this electricity could not be held strictly liable because it was not yet released into the stream
of commerce).
116. See Pierce v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 166 Cal. App. 3d 68, 74, 212 Cal. Rptr. 283
(1985); Ransome, 87 Wis. 2d at 610, 275 N.W.2d at 642-43, 648-50; Houston Lighting &
Power Co. v. Reynolds, 712 S.W.2d 761, 766 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986) rev'd, No. 126108 (Tex.
Nov. 30, 1988) (WESTLAW, States library, TX file); Schriner, 348 Pa. Super. at 189, 501
A.2d at 1134; Public Serv. Indiana, 494 N.E.2d at 355-56.
117. See Sessums v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 562 F.2d 579, 581-83 (5th Cir.
1981), cert. denied 455 U.S. 948 (1982); Alabama Power Co. v. Alexander, 370 So. 2d 252,
254 (Ala. 1979); United Pacific Ins. Co. v. Southern Cal. Edison, 163 Cal. App. 3d 700, 209
Cal. Rptr. 819 (1985); Smith v. Home Light & Power Co., 734 P.2d 1051 (Colo. 1987);
Genaust v. Illinois Power Co., 62 Ill. 2d 456, 465, 343 N.E.2d 465, 470 (1976); Hedges v.
Public Serv. Co. of Indiana, 396 N.E.2d 933, 937 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979); Kentucky Util. Co. v.
Auto Crane Co., 674 S.W.2d 15, 18 (Ky. Ct. App. 1983); Lavergne v. Central Louisiana Elec.
Co., 5093 So. 2d 698, 700 (La. App. 1987); Williams v. Detroit Edison Co., 63 Mich. App.
559, 572, 234 N.W.2d 702, 709 (1975); Vieths v. Ripley, 295 N.W.2d 659, 663 (Minn. 1980);
Wood v. Public Serv. Co. of N.H., 114 N.H. 182, -, 317 A.2d 576 (1974); Farina v.
Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 81 A.D.2d 700, 700, 438 N.Y.S.2d 645, 646 (1981); Otte, 37
Ohio St. 3d a -, 523 N.E.2d at 841; Smithbower v. Southeast Cent. Rural Elec. Coop,,
Inc., 374 Pa. Super. 46, 542 A.2d 140 (1988); Erwin v. Guadalupe Valley Elec. Coop., 505
S.W.2d 353, 355 (Tex. Ct. App. 1974); Bringham v. Moon Lake Elec. Ass'n., 24 Utah 2d 292,
- 470 P.2d 393, 395 (1970); Bosley v. Central Vermont Public Serv. Corp., 127 Vt. 581,
-, 255 A.2d 671, 674 (1969); Kemp v. Wisconsin Elec. Power Co., 44 Wis. 2d 571, 582-83,
172 N.W.2d 161, 166-67 (1969); 3 SHEPARD'S CAUSES OF ACTION 1, § II Strict Liability
(1983). See generally Product Liability: Electricity, supra note 22; Annotation, Liability of
Power Company for Injury or Death Resulting from Contact of Radio or Television Antenna
with Electrical Line, 82 A.L.R. 3d 218 (1978).
118. See McKenzie v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 200 Cal. App. 2d 731, 736, 19 Cal.
Rptr. 628, 631 (1962); Plourde v. Hartford Elec. Light Co., 31 Conn. Supp. 192, 326 A.2d
848 (1974); Nelson v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 124 I11. App. 3d 655, 465 N.E.2d 513; Kent
v. Gulf States Util. Co., 418 So.2d 493 (La. 1982); Wirth v. Mayrath Industires, Inc., 278
N.W.2d 789 (N.D. 1979); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 519, 520 (1977); Shocks,
Shorts & Sparks, supra note 13, at 980 n.38.
119. Pierce, 166 Cal. App. 3d at 85, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 293.
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hold utilities strictly liable.120 While this trend is particularly appar-
ent when the electricity has passed through a customer's meter,12" ' at
least two courts have applied strict liability theories while the elec-
tricity is still in transmission.12 2 Furthermore, these courts have im-
posed strict liability not only in tort actions but also those based
upon an implied warranty.
C. Strict Warranty Liability
The Uniform Commercial Code provides for an implied war-
ranty of merchantability 12 3 and an implied warranty of fitness. 24
Before electricity can qualify for either warranty, however, it must
be considered a "good" as defined by the U.C.C."2 I Additionally, to
qualify for an implied warranty of merchantability, such goods, if
fungible, must be of average quality, 26 fit for the ordinary purpose
for which they are used, 27 adequately packaged and labeled accord-
ing to the agreement,' 28 as well as fulfill any promises or statements
made on the container or label.'
29
As previously discussed, disagreement exists over whether elec-
tricity should be considered a good.' 30 Most courts do agree, how-
ever, that electricity should be considered as a good once it passes
through a customer's meter.'' Thus, although at this stage, electric-
ity could be considered as a good and an implied warranty could
then apply, 3 2 when electricity is in transmission lines it is not yet a
120. See supra note 116. See generally Baynard, Should Strict Products Liability Ap-
ply to the Sale of Electricity?, 55 TENN. L. REV. 317 (1988) [hereinafter Should Strict Prod-
ucts Liability Apply?]; Current Trend, supra note 13; Shocks, Shorts & Sparks, supra note
13; Torts of Electric Utilities, supra note 13; Products Liability: Electricity, supra note 22.
121. See Pierce, 166 Cal. App. 3d at 74, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 285; Ransome, 87 Wis. 2d at
610, 275 N.W.2d at 642-43; Schriner v. Pennsylvania Power & Light Co., 348 Pa. Super. 177,
189, 501 A.2d 1128, 1134.
122. See Public Serv. Indiana v. Nichols, 494 N.E.2d 349, 355-56 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986);
Houston Lighting & Power Co. v. Reynolds, 712 S.W.2d 761, 766 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986),
rev'd, No. 126108 (Tex. Nov. 30, 1988) (WESTLAW States library, TX file).
123. U.C.C. § 2-314 (1988).
124. U.C.C. § 2-315 (1988).
125. U.C.C. § 2-105(1) (1988). See generally Miller, A "Sale of Goods" as a Prerequi-
site for Warranty Protection, 24 Bus. LAW. 847 (1969).
126. U.C.C. § 2-314(2)(b) (1988).
127. U.C.C. § 2-314(2)(c) (1988).
128. U.C.C. § 2-314(2)(e) (1988).
129. U.C.C. § 2-314(2)(f) (1988).
130. See supra notes 36-54 and accompanying text.
131. See supra notes 36-37, 40-41 and accompanying text.
132. See Hedges v. Public Serv. Co. of Indiana, 396 NE.2d 933, 936 (Ind. Ct. APp.
1979) ("[T]he warranty provisions of Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code apply to the
sales of goods . . . .In Helvey we had no problem finding a sale of goods because the electri-
cal current had passed through the meter and into the household electrical system for
consumption.").
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good and no implied warranty exists.183 Additionally, the U.C.C. re-
quirement that a good be "adequately contained, packaged and la-
beled" may pose problems for a concept as elusive as electricity." 4
Despite such considerations, an implied warranty of fitness can
apply to electricity.3M An implied warranty can arise when electric-
ity is sold' or when electricity is placed in the stream of com-
merce.137 American courts thus continue to demonstrate a diversity
of opinion on the treatment of electricity.
VI. A Proposal: Strict Liability Should Not Be Applied to
Electricity
Several courts have justified their increased imposition of strict
liability on electric utilities by emphasizing public policy favoring
consumers. For many plaintiffs, the utility may have been negligent,
but the plaintiff may find it difficult to prove that negligence. 38 Fur-
ther, consumers are often unable to protect themselves from the high
voltage of electricity," a9 and the electric utility may be in a better
position than the consumer to "anticipate, protect against and elimi-
nate possible dangerous overloads" of electricity14 0 or insufficient
supplies of electric current.' 4 ' The courts have reasoned that strict
liability can act as an economic incentive for a company to improve
product safety or to induce the allocation of resources toward safer
products."4  Further, electric utilities can more easily absorb or
spread the financial losses that result from injuries and damages.' 4
133. Id. ("While the delivery of 135 volts of electricity under the circumstances in
Helvey can be considered the sale of a defective good, the tragic escape of 7200 volts from the
transmission wire . . . is not a transaction in goods intended to be covered by the Uniform
Commercial Code."). See also Navarro County Elec. Corp. v. Prince, 640 S.W.2d 398, 400
(Tex. Ct. App. 1982).
134. See supra notes 29-33 and accompanying text.
135. See Buckeye Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Detroit Edison, 38 Mich. App. 325, 329, 196
N.W.2d 316, 317 (1972) ("[The implied warranties ... should apply to the sale of services
as well as to the sale of goods.").
136. See id.; Williams v. Detroit Edison, 63 Mich. App. 559, 564, 234 N.W.2d 702, 705
(1975); Wivagg, 73 Pa. D. & C.2d 694, 702 (1975) ("[T]he transaction involved herein is
sufficiently analogous to a 'sale' to justify the extension of the code's warranty protection to the
injured parties.").
137. Aversa v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 186 N.J. Super. 130, 137, 451 A.2d 976,
980 (1982).
138. See Pierce v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 166 Cal. App. 3d 68, 83, 212 Cal. Rptr. 283,
291 (1985). See also Shocks, Shorts and Sparks, supra note 13, at 989.
139. See Ransome v. Wisconsin Elec. Power Co., 87 Wis. 2d 605, 625, 275 N.W.2d 641,
650 (1979).
140. Id.
141. See supra notes 89-91 and accompanying text.
142. Pierce, 166 Cal. App. at 83, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 291.
143. See Id. at 83, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 291; Ransome, 87 Wis. 2d at 625, 275 N.W.2d at
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In contrast, consumers have few choices. Electric power is usually
supplied by only one power company, so that consumers are not free
to select another company.144 Obviously, abstaining from the use of
electricity is unrealistic in a modern world.14 5
Such reasons do not, however, justify the imposition of strict
liability on electric utilities. For example, while the negligence of a
utility may be difficult for some plaintiffs to prove,1 4s the use of the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitor can assist such plaintiffs, 47 by effec-
tively shifting the burden of proof to the defendant.1 48 The doctrine
thus represents an equitable middle ground for both parties. It is
more equitable to a defendant utility than the doctrine of strict lia-
bility, because the utility may still rebut the presumption of negli-
gence in a case of res ipsa loquitor, 49 a defense unavailable in a
case of strict liability.150
Although those favoring strict liability contend that consumers
are often unable to protect themselves from the high voltage of elec-
tricity, such an assertion ignores evidence that many accidents in-
volving electricity are caused by the contributory or comparative
negligence of the plaintiffs themselves.' 51 Importantly, since contrib-
utory or comparative negligence is not a defense to strict liability in
tort in several jurisdictions,15 2 courts that utilize strict liability im-
650. See also Shocks, Shorts and Sparks, supra note 13, at 989.
144. See Ransome, 87 Wis. 2d at 625, 275 N.W.2d at 650.
145. Id.
146. See supra notes 107-08 and accompanying text.
147. See supra notes 111-13 and accompanying text.
148. See supra note 11l and accompanying text.
149. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
150. For defenses to the doctrine of strict liability, see PROSSER, supra note 79, at § 102.
151. For cases illustrating contributory or comparative negligence by plaintiffs, see Ses-
sums v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 652 F.2d 579, 581-83 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied 455
U.S. 948 (1982); Martin v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 546 F. Supp. 780, 781-84 (E.D. La.
1982); Citerella v. United Illuminating Co., 158 Conn. 600, 605, 266 A.2d 382, 385 (1969);
Cratsley v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 38 III. App. 3d 55, 58, 347 N.E.2d 496, 501 (1976);
Hamilton v. Laclede Elec. Coop., 294 S.W.2d 11, 17 (Mo. 1956); Rodgers v. Chimney Rock
Pub. Power Dist., 216 Neb. 666, -, 345 N.W.2d 12, 15 (1984); Lorence v. Omaha Pub.
Power Dist., 191 Neb. 68, -, 214 N.W.2d 238, 249-41 (1974); Erwin v. Guadalupe Valley
Elec. Coop., 505 S.W.2d 353, 357 (Tex. Ct. App. 1974). See generally Annotation, Products
Liability: Sufficiency of Evidence to Support Product Misuse Defense in Actions Concerning
Electrical Generation and Transmission Equipment, 55 A.L.R. 4TH 1010, 1012-14 (1987),
Annotation, Liability for Injury or Death When Object is Manually Brought Into Contact
With or Close Proximity to Electric Line, 33 A.L.R. 4TH 809, 858-70 (1984).
152. See Citerella, 158 Conn. at 610, 266 A.2d at 387; Troszynski v. Commonwealth
Edison Co., 42 Ill. App. 3d 925, 932, 356 N.E.2d 926, 932 (1976); Kentucky Util. Co. v. Auto
Crane Co., 674 S.W.2d 15, 18 (Ky. Ct. App. 1983); Houston Lighting & Power Co. v. Reyn-
olds, 712 S.W.2d 761, 766 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986), rev'd, No. 126108 (Tex. Nov. 30, 1988)
(WESTLAW States library, TX file); PROSSER, supra note 79, at 478; Annotation, Products
Liability: Contributory Negligence of Assumption of Risk as Defense Under Doctrine of
Strict Liability in Tort, 46 A.L.R. 3D 240 (1972).
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pose an unfair burden on the utilities.' 53 Similarly, to the extent that
findings of gross negligence bar the applicability of defenses of con-
tributory or comparative negligence, 154 such defenses are also inequi-
table. In contrast, traditional negligence theories and the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitor are more equitable since they allow a defendant to
demonstrate that the plaintiff is to blame for his own injuries.
155
With the acceptance of comparative negligence in most jurisdictions,
juries are afforded the opportunity to balance the negligence of each
party and arrive at an equitable decision. 56
Despite the contentions that electric utilities are in a better posi-
tion to anticipate, protect against, and eliminate possible dangerous
overloads of electricity or insufficient supplies, an electric company is
not similar to a manufacturer which can alter that product based on
a strict liability suit.1 57 Electric utilities cannot alter their product
before its sale to a customer. 58
One of the justifications for imposing strict liability in a general
context is that imposition of such liability gives manufacturers a
stronger impetus to create safer products for initial as well as later
sale and distribution.' 0 In the context of electric utilities, such
safety concerns are already resolved by the regulation of electric util-
ities by state and federal governments.6 0 Such extensive government
regulation is the price utilities already pay for the limited monopolies
153. To the extent that contributory or comparative negligence is not a defense to strict
liability, the electric utility becomes an insurer of the public safety, a result that many courts
have rejected. See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text.
154. See Phelps, 62 Tenn. App. at - , 466 S.W.2d at 229 ("Our law is clear that
contributory negligence will not bar recovery in an action based on gross and wanton negli-
gence unless the contributory negligence is also gross and wanton.").
155. See PROSSER, supra note 79, at §§ 39, 65, and 67.
156. Id. at § 67.
157. See, e.g., Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal.
Rptr. 697 (1963).
158. See Hills v. Ozark Border Elec. Coop., 710 S.W.2d 338, 343 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986)
("Applying strict liability in tort to a seller of electricity seems harsher than to the seller of a
product where the seller can more easily prevent alterations to its products before they are
sold.").
159. See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
160. See United Pacific Ins. Co. v. Southern California Edison Co., 163 Cal. App. 3d
700, 709, 209 Cal. Rptr. 819, 824 (1985) ("In the case of a regulated public utility there is
less need than in the case of an unregulated manufacturer to motivate safety precautions by
the economic sanction of strict liability."); Otte v. Dayton Power & Light Co., 37 Ohio St. 3d
33, -, 523 N.E.2d 835, 842 (1988) (Safety regulations are imposed upon an electric utility
by the National Electric Safety Code. "It is doubtful whether the imposition of strict liability
would lead to a safer distribution system."). For examples of safety regulations see also Beck
v. Carolina Power, 57 N.C. App. 373, 375, 291 S.E.2d 897, 898 (1982); Phelps v. Magnavox
Co. of Tenn., Inc., 62 Tenn. App. 578, -, 466 S.W.2d 226, 228-29 (1970); Erwin v.
Guadalupe Valley Elec. Coop., 505 S.W.2d 353, 356-57 (1982).
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that they operate. 161
Government regulation also answers another concern of the
strict liability proponents who contend that electricity utilities, like
the manufacturer of a traditional product, are in a better position to
pass along its costs to other consumers when the company is forced
to pay a judgment in a strict liability suit. 6" Such a cost-benefit
analysis' 6a is inapplicable to an electric utility company. Utilities
cannot summarily raise prices as can the manufacturer of any prod-
uct. Prior to raising their rates, utilities must justify their rate in-
creases before a state utility commission that receives testimony
from consumer groups and other industrial customers who will be
affected by a potential rate increase.'" Because utilities cannot raise
their rates for cost-benefit reasons as readily as other manufacturers,
they should not be subject to strict liability. 6 5 This is especially true
for small electric utilities such as cooperatives and municipal power
systems, which, when faced with large judgments, may have no
choice but to pass those costs on to their customers.' 66 To the extent
that electric utilities are unable to raise their rates as a result of
161. See Arnebergh, Public Utility Regulations and the Community Interest, 30 S. CAL.
L. REV. 191, 191 (1957) ("[Where a necessity of life is provided by a monopoly, effective
regulation of that monopoly is necessary to protect the public interest."). For a history of the
development of both electric utility monopolies and regulation, see also R. RUDOLPH & S.
RIDLEY, POWER STRUGGLE: THE HUNDRED-YEAR WAR OVER ELECTRICITY 10-12, 38-41
(1986) [hereinafter POWER STRUGGLE). See generally PUR GUIDE, supra note 78, at § 4-1.
162. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697
(1963). See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
163. See Shocks, Shorts and Sparks, supra note 13, at 989.
164. The extent of government regulation of utility rates is explained by a California
court:
Edison is a privately owned public utility, subject to government regulation. It
cannot raise rates without approval of the Public Utility Commission. Its profits
are limited to a reasonable return. The company is also subject to review by the
P.U.C. as to what expenses. it will be allowed to treat as reasonable operating
expenses for inclusion in its rates. Imposition of strict liability for defective
transmission facilities will not necessarily pass the burden of paying damages
from the utility to its customers.
United Pacific Ins. Co. v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 163 Cal. App. 3d 700, 709, 209 Cal.
Rptr. 819, 823 (1985). See Otte v. Dayton Power & Light Co., 37 Ohio St. 3d 33, -, 523
N.E.2d 835, 841 ("A public utility in Ohio is highly regulated and price increases may only be
established after administrative approval."). See generally A. PRIEST, PRINCIPLES OF UTILITY
REGULATION 45-51 (1969).
165. See Smith v. Home Light & Power Co., 734 P.2d 1051, 1058 (Colo. 1987)
("[Electric utilities are not as free as ordinary, unregulated private businesses to raise their
prices and spread the costs of strict liability among their consumers."); Otte, 37 Ohio St. 3d at
-, 523 N.E.2d at 841.
166. See Ferguson v. North States Power Co., 307 Minn. 26, 32, 239 N.W.2d 190, 194
(1976) (Although the court considered imposing strict liability to spread the cost of serious
injury among all the consumers of electricity, it did not do so because "[it was] persuaded by
the amicus briefs which detail the severe economic consequences which may be sustained by
the many small electric utilities in the state by the abrupt imposition of such a rule.").
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strict liability judgments, the courts have not accomplished a spread-
ing of risks. Rather, in the case of electric utilities, courts, in their
imposition of strict liability, have shifted the risks from plaintiffs to
the defendant utilities.
1' 7
The arguments of the proponents of strict liability that consum-
ers lack available alternatives to electricity fail to recognize that util-
ities were initially given limited monopolies so that they could take
advantage of economies of scale and provide better service at lower
prices without competition. 68 As indicated previously, in exchange
for these limited monopolies, utilities are highly regulated. 6 Courts
that have opposed the imposition of strict liability have done so in
part because electricity is a public necessity."'
Advocates of strict liability for electric utilities demonstrate
their lack of understanding of the unique characteristics of electric
utility companies when they ignore that there is great variety of
ownership within electric utilities. Electric utilities can be investor-
owned stock companies, cooperatives or municipalities. This diversity
of ownership raises two impediments to the imposition of strict liabil-
ity for electric utilities. First, not all electric utilities are large com-
panies.1 71 Many of the smaller companies, cooperatives and munici-
pal power systems would face severe economic consequences if strict
liability were imposed on a nationwide basis.17 1 Second, there is al-
ways a "danger of dual standards when municipal companies plead
sovereign immunity."'7 3 Certainly it would not be equitable to im-
pose strict liability upon investor-owned electric utilities and cooper-
atives while allowing municipalities to escape strict liability by
167. Should Strict Products Liability Apply?, supra note 120, at 338. See also United
Pacific Ins. Co., 163 Cal. App. at 709, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 823 ("Imposition of strict liability for
defective transmission facilities will not necessarily pass the burden of paying damages from
the utility to its customers.").
168. See generally REPORT OF THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW
YORK, SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON ELECTRIC POWER AND THE ENVIRONMENT, ELECTRICITY AND
THE ENVIRONMENT: THE REFORM OF LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 164-67 (1972).
169. See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
170. See Kentucky Util. co. v. Auto Crane Co., 674 S.W.2d 15, 18 (Ky. Ct. App. 1983)
("The transmission of electricity is a public necessity."); Wirth v. Mayrath Industries, Inc.,
278 N.W.2d 789, 794 (1979) ("We agree that electrical power is necessary to the well-being
of our country and our state, and believe that it is becoming more important as other sources
of energy become scarce."); Bringham v. Moon Lake Elec. Ass'n., 24 Utah 2d 292, -, 470
P.2d 393, 395 (1970) ("Our civilization could not exist without electricity...").
171. See POWER STRUGGLE, supra note 161, at 12 (The electric utility industry "con-
sists of 2,194 municipal and public utility district systems, which range in size from the city of
Los Angeles to the hamlet of Readsboro, Vermont, 870 rural cooperatives . . .210 private
companies that supply power in most major cities, and six federal agencies that provide power
• .. from federal dams.").
172. See supra note 166 and accompanying text.
173. Shocks, Shorts and Sparks, supra note 13, at 1010.
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pleading sovereign immunity. Therefore, strict liability should not be
imposed on any electric utility.
The final reason for abandoning strict liability is to remedy the
disparate treatment of electricity and provide for a more consistent
approach to this important concern. In abandoning the disparate
treatment of electricity, one form of liability should be used consist-
ently by courts and legislatures.
Thus, for the purpose of products liability, courts should con-
sider electricity within the confines of negligence theories. Where
possible, plaintiffs should attempt to invoke the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitor because it provides the consumer with a better claim than
simple negligence because of the theory's provision for an inference
of negligence.1 14 For the defendant utility company, res ipsa provides
a rebuttable presumption,"7 " which is preferable to strict liability.1 76
Thus, res ipsa loquitor acts as a compromise measure between tradi-
tional negligence theories and strict liability.
VII. Solutions to the Disparate Treatment of Electricity
The disparate treatment of electricity by courts in various states
throughout the country demonstrates that there is a need for a uni-
fied federal system. As previously stated, the best way for courts to
treat cases in which electricity results in personal or property dam-
age is with the theory of res ipsa loquitor. This theory should be
proposed by appropriate federal legislation.
Unfortunately, logic supporting federal legislation does not
guarantee its passage. During the 100th Congress, the House of
Representatives addressed the subject of product liability reform. On
June 14, the House Energy and Commerce Committee voted 30 to
12 in favor of H.R. 1115 to establish the first federal product liabil-
ity law.
177
Although H.R. 1115 would have preempted conflicting state
laws with a federal liability standard,17 8 the bill that the committee
reported specifically exempted electric, gas and steam utility services
by exempting electricity from the definition of product.' Therefore,
174. See supra notes 108-11 and 146-48 and accompanying text.
175. See supra notes 112-13 and 149-50 and accompanying text.
176. See supra notes 116-22 and accompanying text.
177. See Starobin, House Panel Approves Product-Liability Bill, 46 CONG. Q. 1671
(June 18, 1988).
178. Id. at 1671.
179. See H.R. REP. No. 748, 100th Cong., 2nd Sess., pt. I, at 11 (1988). See also
Edison Electric Institute, EEl Washington Letter, Legislative Wrap-Up: 100th Congress, Sec-
ond Session, final page (October 28, 1988).
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for the purposes of this federal legislation, electricity was excluded
as a product that would be subject to product liability lawsuits. 180
The bill, however, died in other committees, and reform advocates
have been forced to look to state legislatures for reform.
Justice Brandeis characterized state legislatures as "laboratories
of reform."'181 In addition, at least one state supreme court has advo-
cated state legislative reform with respect to electricity.182 Such a
position is consistent with analogous areas of case law. In the related
area of blood transfusions, state legislatures continue to demonstrate
their receptivity to reform by enacting limitations on the use of strict
liability or implied warranty theories. 18 As with electricity, courts
and legislatures have tried to determine whether to classify blood as
a product, a service, a sale or a good.' 84 To date, 48 states have
passed "blood shield" legislation that limits liability by one of the
following methods: 1) by declaring a transfusion to be a service; 2)
by limiting potential theories of liability to negligence actions; or 3)
by limiting liability only if the defect cannot be detected. 85
Of these three methods, two have possible application to the lia-
bility of electricity. First, electric utilities could attempt to persuade
their state legislatures to amend their state commercial codes to ex-
empt electricity from the definitions of sale and good and to specifi-
cally classify electricity as a service. In the area of blood transfu-
sions, Tennessee amended its Commercial Code to classify
transactions involving blood as "medical services" rather than as
sales. 86
180. Cf. Supra notes 19-30 and accompanying text.
181. New York State Ice Co. v. Liebeman, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
182. See Ferguson v. N. States Power, 307 Minn. 26, 32, 239 N.W.2d 190, 194 (1976)
(In considering the economic effect which the imposition of strict liability would have upon
many small electric utilities within the state, the Supreme Court of Minnesota decided to "call
this matter to the attention of the legislature which is better equipped to resolve economic
problems of this nature."). See also Shocks, Shorts and Sparks, supra note 13, at 1011
("[T]he legislature could be convinced that an in-depth study of the consequences of applying
strict liability to utilities is necessary to protect the population. However, until such analysis
and weighing is done, courts should refrain from entering such virginal territory.").
183. See L. Del Duca, Constitutionality of Statutory Exclusion of Implied Warranties,
8 U.C.C. L.J. 5, 9-13 (1975) [hereinafter Exclusion of Implied Warranties].
184. For blood transfusion cases, see id. at 9-13. For cases dealing with the classification
of electricity, see supra notes 19-78 and accompanying text.
185. See Roberts v. Suburban Hosp., 73 Md. App. 1, 10-11 n.3, 532 A.2d 1081, 1086
n.3 (1987).
186. TENN. COoE ANN. § 47-2-316(5) (1967), construed in McDaniel v. Baptist Memo-
rial Hosp., 469 F.2d 230, 232 (6th Cir. 1972). For a discussion of this statute and case, see
Exclusion of Implied Warranties, supra note 183, at 12-13. Cf. Samson v. Greenville Hops,
Sys., - S.C. -, -, 368 S.E.2d 665, 667 (1988) (upholding a South Carolina statute
which not only characterizes the transfusion of blood as a medical service rather than a sale,
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Courts have respected a state legislature's classification of blood
transfusions as services rather than sales. In McDaniel v. Baptist
Memorial Hospital,187 in light of that amendment, a federal court
declined to include blood transactions as sales within the criteria of
strict liability of Section 402A.18 8 The court concluded that the Ten-
nessee legislature had intentionally amended its commercial code to
protect hospitals from both implied warranties and strict product lia-
bility actions.1 89
Second, utilities may lobby their legislatures to limit their liabil-
ity to that arising from negligence actions. Such legislation should
limit the utilities' exposure to only negligence actions but allow
plaintiffs to invoke the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor19 0 Pennsylvania,
for blood transfusion cases, has passed legislation limiting liability to
negligence actions. 91
Such statutes have been upheld.19' In Bartholomew v.
Quakertown Hospital Association,1'9 for example, the plaintiffs
challenged the Pennsylvania statute limiting liability in blood trans-
fusion cases to negligence actions.1 94 They claimed that the law vio-
lated their due process and equal protection rights under the federal
Constitution195 and Article III, Section 18 of the Pennsylvania Con-
stitution, which states that the General Assembly shall not "limit the
amount to be recovered for injuries."' 98 The court upheld the consti-
tutionality of the statute and ruled that it did not violate the federal
due process requirements because the plaintiff failed to establish that
it was impossible to obtain facts to establish the defendant's negli-
gence.1 97 Of course, if states pass new laws encouraging the filing of
actions utilizing res ipsa loquitor, plaintiffs would not be required to
but also removes blood and human tissues from "the class of 'products' which are bought and
sold").
187. 469 F.2d 230 (6th Cir. 1972).
188. Id. at 232-34.
189. Id. at 233.
190. See supra notes 108-09 and accompanying text.
191. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 10021 (Purdon 1974), cited in Exclusion of Implied
Warranties, supra note 183, at 10.
192. See Samson v. Greenville Hosp. System, - S.C .... 368 S.E.2d 665,
667 (1988) ("Our research indicates-and plaintiffs frankly concede-that of the 48 blood
shield statutes enacted nationwide, not one hasibeen ruled unconstitutional on Equal Protec-
tion grounds."). See also Roberts v. Suburban Hosp., 73 Md. App. 1, 16, 532 A.2d 1081,
1089.
193. 25 Bucks Co. L. Rep. 250 (Pa. Com. Pl. 1974), af'd, 231 Pa. Super. 724, 327 A.2d
161 (1974).
194. Id.
195. Bartholomew, 25 Bucks Co. L. Rep. at 252-53.
196. Id.
197. Id.
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prove a defendant's negligence. Plaintiffs need only prove that the
damage could not have been inflicted without negligence, that the
electricity was within the control of the defendant and that the elec-
tricity caused the damage.198 A law encouraging res ipsa loquitor
actions would further undercut the possibility of such constitutional
challenges by reducing the plaintiff's trial burden to prove the de-
fendant's negligence.
Therefore, it is probable that electric utilities could persuade
their legislatures to apply two of the methods successfully utilized by
hospitals in blood transfusion to either limit liability to negligence
actions or to classify transactions in electricity as services rather
than as sales. Based upon the discussed blood transfusion cases, both
methods are likely to be upheld in court.'99 By encouraging such
amendments in state laws or state commercial codes, electric utilities
could eliminate the disparate treatment of electricity and make the
law uniform among the various jurisdictions. 00
VII. Conclusion
Electricity continues to receive disparate treatment throughout
the United States. Although electricity is generally defined differ-
ently when it is in transmission and when it passes through a cus-
tomer's meter, even this generalization does not apply in all jurisdic-
tions. In defining electricity as a product, a service, a good or a sale
in different circumstances, it is little wonder that courts in different
jurisdictions disagree over whether electricity should be treated
within negligence theories or whether strict liability or implied war-
ranties should be imposed on electric utilities.
Because of the unique nature of electricity and the differences
between the highly regulated utility industry and other manufactur-
ers, strict liability in tort or implied warranties should not be im-
posed on electric utilities. Further, strict liability would impose a
heavy burden on the numerous small electric companies, coopera-
tives and municipal electric utilities. Courts and legislatures could
create more balanced treatment if they treated electricity within the
confines of traditional negligence theories that would enable plain-
tiffs to utilize the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor and gross negligence
when appropriate. The use of res ipsa loquitor would enable plain-
198. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
199. See supra notes 185-89 and 192-97 and accompanying text.
200. See Helvey v. Wabash County REMC, 151 Ind. App. 176, -, 278 N.E.2d 608,
610 (1972).
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tiffs to shift the burden of proof while at the same time permitting
defendants the opportunity to rebut a presumption of negligence.
While the ultimate solution to the disparate treatment of elec-
tricity probably lies with federal legislation, the difficulties encoun-
tered with product liability reform in the last Congress make such
prospects dim. In the meantime, electric utilities may find greater
success at the state level by adopting the tactics successfully utilized
by hospitals in limiting their liability for blood transfusions. Specifi-
cally, electric utilities could seek passage of state laws that either
limit liability to negligence actions or classify electricity as a service
rather than as a sale.
Until such actions are taken, electric utilities will continue to
face judgments in excess of a million dollars and be forced to choose
between absorbing these losses themselves or attempting to pass
these additional costs along to the public at large through increased
electric rates. Since neither of these alternatives are attractive, utili-
ties should attempt to convince legislators that more equitable solu-
tions are available.
Louis Lawrence Boyle


